Why Is European Union Defence Integration Difficult To Achieve? by Marambanyika, Ocean
  
 
 DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES (CES) 
 
 
 
 
 
Why Is European Union Defence Integration 
Difficult To Achieve?  
 
 
 
Ocean Marambanyika 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis: Master’s thesis  
Program: EMAES – Executive Master’s Programme in European Studies 
Ocean Marambanyika 
ii 
 
Semester/year: Spring 2018 
Supervisor: Adrian Hyde-Price 
 Abstract 
This thesis utilises the inter-governmentalism theory and the content analysis method to 
critically analyse the reasons why defence integration is difficult in the EU. The main primary 
empirical source for this thesis is the 2017 EU Council decision establishing the Permanent 
Structured Cooperation (PESCO). The research gap identified in this research is that PESCO 
is a new EU Council Decision passed in December 2017 and this PESCO has not been widely 
studied since it’s newer. As such most of the debate in this thesis is dominated by researching 
the positives and drawbacks of PESCO in relation to EU defence integration. However the 
PESCO document alone cannot answer the main research question of why EU defence 
integration is difficult to achieve. As such secondary sources like academic articles are used to 
answer the research question. The main research focus is mostly on current defence issues and 
not the history of defence. In endeavoring to find answers to the main question of why 
defence integration is difficult in the EU, I looked at sub-questions related to the pros-and-
cons of PESCO; the pros-and-cons of NATO; the effect of European defence clusters on EU 
efforts at defence integration; institutional challenges in the EU; the sovereignty issue and 
examples of the strategic positions of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the CSDP. 
The new contribution I hoped to make was to try to link these arguments to the recent defence 
intgeration developments based on PESCO. The topic is complex and challenging but 
necessary for policymaking.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Aim of this study: analysing the problem of achieving EU defence integration.  
Despite decades of efforts to develop security and defence cooperation in the EU, it remains 
clear that defence integration is an agonisingly difficult area for the EU. After all, one of the 
endogenous motivating factors for the EU when she thinks of security is that the fundamental 
objective of the European project “was to bind together the fates of Europe’s core nations in a 
way that would both render intra-European war unthinkable and maximize European 
influence in the outside world” (Howorth, 2017: 347). Defence integration is one of the steps 
that can quickly reduce the possibility of intra-European war. Nevertheless integration of the 
EU’s defences has lagged behind in comparison to areas like economic, monetary and legal 
integration. This research thesis wishes to find out the reasons why defence integration has 
been so difficult for the EU to realise.  
 
From the 13
th
 of November 2017 the EU announced the Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO) widely reported in the media as the EU defence pact. The PESCO notification was 
send by 23 Member State ministers to the High representative and to the Council for a 
decision to be made.  “On 11 December 2017, the Council adopted a decision establishing 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), less than a month after receiving a joint 
notification by member states of their intention to participate. The 25 member states 
participating in PESCO are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and 
Sweden” (European council press release, 11.12.2017). The List of Ambitions (LoA) outlined 
by HRVP Mogherini in PESCO clearly show that a full-fledged EU defence integration is a 
sensitive and challenging case (PECSO Notification, 2017). Using the inter-governmentalism 
theory we will see how PESCO confirms the inter-governmentalist argument that states are 
central deciders on how defence integration will progress.  
 
It has to be emphasised from the start that this research focuses mainly on discussing 
defence integration rather than security integration.  A brief distinction between defence 
and security is therefore warranted. It was not easy to find literature devoted only on EU 
defence without mentioning security and defence together. Since I realised that security and 
defence are almost always lumped together it becomes necessary to define these two terms so 
that understanding the difficulties of integration in EU defence can become more visible. 
 
Defining of Security  
Bendiek noted that ‘there is a clear legal separation between the defence Union and the 
security Union’- ‘the security Union is predominantly driven by the Commission and focuses 
mainly on new issues in internal and judicial policy, but also aims to interlink internal and 
external security’ (Bendiek, 2016: 16 SWP RP11) and the security Union is based on the 
concept of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ)’. For example the 2015 European 
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Agenda on security regards organised crime, terrorism, and cyber criminality as security 
challenges. Bendiek goes on to say that the main legal basis of the security Union is article 67 
TFEU subject to article 4 paragraph 2 of the TEU and article 72 of the TFEU which create the 
AFSJ. Examples of Security issues outlined within the AFSJ framework are counter-
terrorism, radicalisation, data banks, information exchanges, infrastructure protection, 
tightening gun laws, data protection, policing, border management, hate speech and illegal 
content (Bendiek, 2016: 16-17 SWP RP11).  These security areas as defined by Bendiek are 
better integrated in the EU than areas that fall in the definition of defence. 
 
 Meaning of Defence  
In contrast the defence Union is a political project proposed by foreign and defence ministers 
(Bendiek, 2016: 16 SWP RP11). This definition quickly reminds of us the inter-
governmentalist argument on state actors as central actors in defence policies. A November 
2016 European Parliament report on future military cooperation within the EU called for any 
newly created defence Union to enable the interlocking of national armies and to transform 
battlegroups into standing units (European Parliament, 30.11.2016). Here we see that defence 
has more to do with soldiers, with armies, as opposed to security which has more to do with 
police and intelligence operatives. The European Parliament report also mentioned issues like 
cooperation in arms procurement. A 2016 EU Commission European Defence Action Plan 
(EDAP) called for sufficient capacity building for military operations (EDAP, 30.11.2016). 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) is expected to help in areas like for example in-flight 
refuelling, remote-controlled aviation systems, satellite communications and cyber defences 
(Bendiek, 2016: 18). The EU’s European Defence Fund (EDF) is intended to support joint 
research into defence technologies (Beckmann and Kempin, 2017). Other defence items 
mentioned in different EU documents include helicopter software, unmanned aviation 
systems, mobile reconnaissance robots for urban warfare and common industrial norms in 
defence (Bendiek, 2016: 18). 
 
In summary the differences between security and defence issues as outlined by these authors 
is that security in more aligned to police duties whilst defence is more related to military 
items. This research’s focus is on the defence challenges inherent in EU integration.  Since 
the core of this research pertains to “defence integration” it is necessary to briefly lay out the 
meaning of integration in the context of European integration studies. 
 
Meaning of integration 
Ernst Haas defined integration in the Uniting of Europe (1958) by saying that ‘integration 
equals the formation of a new political community. In the process of integration, national 
political actors were persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities for 
a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the national states’ (Haas, 
1958, pp.4-5). Oxford dictionary states that ‘European integration is the formation of 
European states into the world’s closest regional association, which has assumed many of the 
characteristics of the statehood’ (in Ladic, 2018: 5).  Based on the definition by Haas, defence 
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integration will mean that national armies have to shift their loyalties to a new EU center with 
jurisdiction over national armies. The reality is that this is not the case in the EU today. It 
shows that defence integration is difficult but Larrabee (2004:67) and de Wijk (2004) argue 
that the only way to increase European military capability is a greater degree of European 
defence integration (in Ojanen, 2006:73). Defence integration is therefore a vexing enterprise 
for the EU and the reasons for these difficulties are what this research attempted to answer 
using the inter-governmentalist theory and sub-research questions related to this theory. Let 
us talk about what inter-governmentalist theory is and how the thesis research questions are 
base intertwined to the theory. But first, I outline a brief on the organisation of the study and 
then a discussion of the theoretical framework follows. 
 
Organisation of the study 
The study is about finding out the reasons why defence integration in the EU is difficult. The 
paper started by outlining the research aim of the study and defining key concepts like 
defence, security and integration. The following chapter 2 will outline the theoretical 
framework and link it to the research questions since the theory will guide the data collection 
that will answer the research question. Chapter 2 will also briefly explains the research 
design, data and methods. Chapter 3 is a literature review discussing what previous 
literatures have said on the issue of defence integration. This chapter also use literature review 
to justify the need for doing more research in defence integration. Chapter 4 focuses on 
PESCO and analyses the potential opportunities and difficulties connected to the future of 
defence integration in the EU within the PESCO framework. Chapter 5 discusses how NATO 
and USA can be problems and opportunities in the quest for an EU defence Union.  Chapter 6 
discusses how sovereignty is an obstacle in efforts aimed at EU defence integration.  Chapter 
7 discusses causes of defence integration difficulties like decision-making challenges, 
disunity, fear of mission failures and lack of trust between Member States. Chapter 8 gives 
examples of how major decision-making powers like Germany, France and United Kingdom 
impact defence integration and discusses why defence clusters are mushrooming outside the 
EU framework. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by summarising the reasons that make EU 
defence integration difficult and by reshowing how the inter-governmentalist theory answers 
the research question of this study. 
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Chapter 2:  Theory, research question, data and methods 
 
This thesis is not about theory testing but rather about using the inter-governmentalist 
approach to explore an empirical problem. There are many theories of European integration 
but I will use inter-governmentalist theory to discuss the paper’s research question. Inter-
governmentalist theory gives a glimpse of the complexity of why defence integration is a 
difficult enterprise for the EU.  
 
Meaning of Inter-governmentalist theory 
Inter-governmentalists argue that European integration is a standard process of inter-state 
bargaining with a view to furthering the national interests of member states (Howorth, 2017: 
344). Stanley Hoffman (1966) argued 50 years ago that integration would not and could not 
be happen in the area of ‘high politics’ of which defence was the ultimate example. Another 
inter-governmentalist, Andrew Moravcsik (1998), argued that although other types of social 
actors can bargain at the international level for more policy coordination, ultimately, key 
decisions will always be taken by states and once again security and defence coordination is 
seen as unintegratable (in Howorth, 2017: 344). In 1993, Moravcsik wrote that the principle 
of inter-governmentalism suggests a process of rational bargaining in negotiations, where 
each Member State seeks to defend the ‘national interest’ and lays down ‘red lines’ which it 
will not be prepared to see crossed (Moravcsik, 1993, 1998). Hatton and Sonny (2015) 
summarised their understanding of inter-governmentalist theory by writing that “Inter-
governmentalism emphasises the role of the nation state in integration, and argues that the 
nation state is not becoming obsolete due to European integration’’ and Alan Milward, argued 
that the national governments of the Member States were the primary actors in the process of 
European integration, and rather than being weakened by it as some of their sovereignty was 
delegated to the EU, they become strengthened because in some policy areas it is in the 
Member State’s interest to pool sovereignty.  Hatton and Sonny further stated that Inter-
governmentalist also argue that periods of radical change in EU integration can be explained 
by convergence of Member State interest and periods of slow integration occurred when the 
government’s preferences diverge and they cannot agree (Hatton and Sony: 2015 ). Based on 
these explanations of the meaning of inter-governmentalist theory, I think that  the main 
reasons for the difficulties of integrating defence in the EU are because of EU Member States 
who are central drivers of NATO, of sovereignty, of defence clusters, of PESCO, of militaries 
and of decision making.  
 
So, in line with the inter-governmentalist theory the main research question is “Why is 
European Union defence integration difficult for the EU to achieve?” To tackle this 
question the following sub-research questions which will help in categorising and analysing 
relevant data. These sub-research questions are as follows:  
Sub research questions 
1. What are the reasons behind the difficulties in defence integration in the EU? 
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2. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a turning point in EU defence 
integration?  
3. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a drawback in EU defence 
integration?  
4. Does the existence of NATO make EU defence integration less important and less 
pressing for EU Member States? 
5. Why are defence-clusters emerging outside of the EU framework, and what are their 
implications for the EU defense integration?  
6. How does sovereignty impact defence integration in the EU? 
7. How do the roles played by Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the EU help 
us to understand the challenges in EU defence integration? 
 
The inter-governmentalist approach attempts to answer these questions by raising issues to do 
with national interests of member states (Howorth, 2017: 344), integration difficulties in ‘high 
politics’ (Hoffman, 1966); states as key decisions makers with national interests (Moravcsik 
1993 and 1998) and states as the primary actors in the process of European integration and 
pooling of sovereignty (Alan Milward quoted in Hatton and Sonny, 2015).  Even though 
PESCO is approved by the EU council and reviewed by the HRVP together with others, it is 
clear that, in line with arguments in the inter-governmentalist theory, it is the EU Member 
States who are can make or break PESCO and ultimately it is these states who can make 
defence integration happen or sink. 
 
It should also be born in mind that the liberal inter-governmentalism theory in this thesis is 
part of the larger inter-governmentalist theory framework that this research is based on. For 
the purpose of this study it was not necessary to split liberal inter-governmentalism theory 
from inter-governmentalist theory but instead both are taken under one umbrella. This is due 
to the fact that liberal inter-governmentalism   is a development of the intergovernmental 
theory and was established by Andrew Moravcsik in his 1998 book called ‘The choice for 
Europe’. Like inter-governmentalism theory, liberal inter-governmentalism emphasises 
national governments as they key actors in the process of integration (Hatton & Sonny 2015). 
However, it also incorporates the liberal model of preference formation, whereby national 
governments have a strong idea of what their preferences are and pursue them in bargaining 
with other Member States.  Liberal inter-governmentalists argue that the bargaining power of 
states is important in the pursuit of integration, and they see institutions as a means of creating 
credible commitments to make sure that other governments stick to their side of the 
bargaining.  Liberal inter-governmentalists consider supranational institutions to be of limited 
importance, in contrast to neo-functionalists (ibid.). The liberal inter-governmentalist 
perspective can be utilised to explain the bargains made in the PESCO framework.  
  
Another branch of the inter-governmentalist theory is the new inter-governmentalism theory 
which argues that traditional institutions of supra-nationalism have by and large accepted the 
dominance of intergovernmental policy shaping practices (Howorth, 2017: 345). Again for 
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the purposes of this research, the new inter-governmentalist theory is placed under the 
umbrella of the inter-governmentalist theory.  The new inter-governmentalist argument still 
make states vital deciders on whether or not defence integration will be consolidated in the 
EU.   
 
It should also be born in mind that the inter-governmentalist theory is not the only theory that 
can explain European integration.  Neo-functionalism, post-functionalism and multi-level 
governance are some of the theories of European integration.  Neofunctionalism focus on 
erosion of sovereignty by supranational actors (Hoffman: 1966) and argue that progress in 
one area give rise to calls for integration other areas (Hooghe and Marks: 314) and is 
concerned with day-day policy making (ibid. 314 &315) and says that economic gains lie 
behind calls for regional integration (ibid.315). Like postfunctionalism, neofunctionalism 
emphasise actors other than the states. Postfunctionalism says our understanding must go 
beyond economic interests of groups and elites (ibid.) but consider influence of communal 
identity (ibid. 311). Now, public opinion on integration affects states (ibid. 317). Maastricht 
brought referendums and politicians now fear election defeat if integration is not handled well 
(ibid.). Electionalization of integration has changed the process of decision making as a 
Eurosceptic, un-ignorable public has taken space from the elites (ibid.). Before, the elites 
ruled because the public was incapable (Haas: 1958). Hooghe and Marks note that political 
party debates are conducted in terms of identity (Hooghe and Marks 2008:327) with right 
wing parties aiming to get votes and oppose integration. The neofunctionalism years were 
under permissive consensus but the post 1991 period is under dissensus (ibid. 316). Now 
Identity has greater weight in public opinion and governments are now responsive to public 
pressures on European integration (ibid. 319). Hooghe and Marks seem to suggest that it is 
the electorate and mass politics which will affect the direction of integration and they will not 
beg the federal authority for help because EU issues are into national politics and national 
politics is into the EU now (ibid.321). Haas say the Left cries for a united Europe (Haas 
1958:148) whilst Hooghe and Marks noted that right wing parties reject integration in favour 
of national sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks 2008:323). The writers agree that political parties 
play a role in the integration debate. They also agree that there is an element of advantage 
seeking. Haas point out that community formation is dominated by national groups who have 
specific interests and aims who turn to federal institution when profitable (Haas 1958 in 
Nelsen and Stubb 2014:148) whilst Hooghe and Marks noted that voter’s identity based 
decisions are also affected by consideration of advantages. The bottom line is that neo-
functionalists and post-functionalists argue that there are factors beyond the national 
governments that affect the process of integration. Even the Multi-level governance theory 
clearly shows that numerous actors contribute to the European policy process, including but 
not solely, the state (Awesti, A. 2006:2).  
 
The point here is that there are some perspectives who argue in contrast to inter-
governmentalist theories.  For example Howorth (2011:3) noted that “In virtually every case”, 
decisions on foreign and security policy “are shaped and taken by small groups of relatively 
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well-socialized officials in the key committees acting in a mode which is as close to 
supranational as is it is to intergovernmental” (ibid.) He further noted that CSDP ‘decisions 
are actually shaped and formulated by a host of working groups and committees labouring 
away in the Council Secretariat , the Commission and the national capitals’ (ibid.:7). This is a 
position which argues for the role of institutions.  
 
Despite these other alternative theories, that I will not dwell much on due to space constraints, 
I believe that the inter-governmentalist school offers us a better chance in understanding the 
reasons why defence integration is difficult in the EU. The other theories mentioned above are 
very useful when one wants to understand integration in socio-cultural-economic areas. But in 
the defence integration area, it is mostly the inter-governmentalist theory which proffers a 
better explanation and as such this theory guides the discussion in this research thesis. In 
addition to theory, research design and methods are critical components of any academic 
research.  
 
Research Design 
The case study is the European Union’s defence policy. I will focus mainly on the areas of 
Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); NATO; Germany-France-United Kingdom; 
sovereignty and decision-making issues. The PESCO document and academic articles will 
help me to dig out why defence integration is a tricky item for the EU to achieve. My data 
gathering method is the content analysis method. I will analyse the language in the PESCO 
document and in relevant academic articles discussing EU defence in order to discuss why 
defence integration is difficult for the EU to achieve.  
 
Data, methodology and methods 
The analysis in this thesis is mainly based on the PESCO document and academic articles 
related to the study of EU defence. The text analysis method involves reading different texts, 
finding different arguments and then categorizing the data in order to sort the data in a way 
that can answer the research question. This is the approach adopted in this research. 
 
I believe that a content analysis of PESCO decision, policy statements of Member States like 
the Germany white book on defence and secondary academic literature analysing PESCO and 
CSDP can, among others, assist with sufficient resources to answer the question of EU’s 
difficulties in defence integration. In this research, I don’t think interviews will provide me 
with data that will be significantly different from what I can find in relevant EU and Member 
State’s policy documents and different secondary publications. Content analysis is therefore 
the preferred method based on its advantages outline by scholars including Titscher.  
 
In this research paper, I will, among others, analyse the EU PESCO decision and the impact 
of NATO and defence cluster on defence integration. I will analyse defence debates in related 
academic publications. Content analysis allows the sampling of cases (here the defence 
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integration case) and breaking down the case into units of analysis, categories and coding and 
analysis and evaluation (Titscher et al, 2000:58-61). The research thesis is made up of 
subheadings made through the process of coding and categorisation of themes based on 
readings of different academic articles on the case of EU defence integration.  
 
I used the content analysis method but there are many other methods. It was possible to use 
other methods or combine different methods if the timeframe and space allowed it. 
Nevertheless methods like ethnography require that “all social research is based upon the 
human capacity for participant observation and the capability for reflecting upon it” (Titscher 
et al, 2000:90).  The defence integration case I am analysing is not well suited for participant 
observation. Usually the EU issues policy documents and press statements which can also be 
best studied using the content analysis method. Ethnography is more suited when one is 
geared towards researching the cultural, anthropological and communication sectors. Content 
analysis method fit well with the European integration theories since it is possible to analyse 
the contents of EU policies like the PESCO decision and CSDP documents and academic 
articles and then compare the arguments and propositions in these papers.  The European 
integration theories can thus be brought in to see how they match with the categorized data or 
how the theories can guide further data collection and analysis. 
 
The EU defence policy is the case study. The thesis focused on debating the current EU 
defence integration challenges but not on defence policy progression. CSDP and PESCO are 
the drivers of the current EU defence policy and this is why the PESCO document is an 
important source.  There is a complex relationship between PESCO and CSDP. CSDP has 
been studied a lot before and as such I will focus more on PESCO since it’s a new policy 
approved by the EU in 2018. The PESCO decision is new and not many secondary documents 
on the latest PESCO developments are available. However the 2018 EU PESCO decision has 
been a subject of interest in influential think tanks on EU (e.g. Politico, SWP Germany, 
Carnegie Europe, etc.). Think-tanks publications are a useful source of information on 
PESCO and defence integration.  
 
The inter-governmentalist integration theory guided my data collection and analysis. In 
addition to theory and methods, issues of quality and validity are important in research. 
 
Issues of Quality, Validity and Ethics  
 I tried to aim for quality arguments and discussions by attempting to use the content analysis 
method to categorize and sort my data in a tandem with the inter-governmentalist theory 
which I used as a data collection guide. This thesis is not about theory testing but rather about 
using the inter-governmentalism approach to explore the empirical problem of defence 
integration in the EU. Prior theories help to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 2009:18 
and Godsater, 2013:24). 
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I tried to carry the aims and research questions of this paper throughout the discussion. I will 
not leave the research question and then go back to it after. Instead I attempted to walk 
together with research question through all stages of the writing process in order to make sure 
that I find answers to why defence integration is a challenge in the EU. This was an attempt to 
safeguards issues of validity and quality. The content analysis methods and the inter-
governmentalist theories helps to answer what this research intend to answer and thereby 
hoping to take validity and quality into consideration.  
  
Clearly citing my sources and references contribute with enhancing research validity as well 
as keeping in line with ethical and professional issues.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Literature review: Challenges in defence integration 
 
Most current and previous studies on the topic of defence integration in the EU have mainly 
been focused on combining security and defence into one bracket and these studies have been 
mainly on CSDP missions. In fact most studies have a focus on EU ‘security’ policy and less 
on ‘defence’ policy on its own right.  But the political thinking of integrating defence in the 
EU is not knew in the EU even though there are less studies on defence than on security. For 
example Anderson noted that the idea of supranational European defence collaboration dates 
back to the very beginning of integration efforts in Europe after World War II when French 
Prime Minister Rene Pleven called for a European defence Community (EDC) and the 
creation of a European army under a supranational authority in October 1950, to be funded by 
a common European defence budget but this was never realised even though the ideas are 
arguably even more valid today (Andersson et al 2016:12).  Thus the idea of defence 
integration has always been there but ‘more often than not, defence and military issues were 
the object of exceptions and derogation to the rules especially with regard to funding (no EU 
budget) and voting (no QMV) procedures (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:11).  This 
‘exceptionalism’ treatment of the defence area may have contributed to less focus on defence 
as compared to more focuses on security studies. However the Lisbon Treaty has changed the 
defence ‘exceptionalism’ from constraining to enabling provisions (ibid.). Here it can be seen 
that the area of defence is evolving.  Building on these arguments, this thesis, shows the inter-
governmentalist nature of problems curtailing faster defence integration in the EU.  Even as 
recent as the 1990s the area of defence was considered sensitive. As Howorth noted, “any 
notion of an autonomous EU role in the field of security (let alone defence) remained virtually 
unthinkable for most of the 1990s” (Howorth, 2017: 343). Howorth goes on to say that there 
are tensions between Brussels and the national capitals in the area of security and defence 
policies (ibid.).  Howorth is one of the established authors on EU who have started to shift 
more focus to defence integration and as such this paper developed further based on his 
different propositions.  In this 2017 article Howorth briefly traces the stagnant developments 
in EU defence in the 1990s but he says  that “beginning in 1999 after the ground breaking 
Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo, the EU progressively sought to develop an autonomous 
capacity in security and even – at least on paper- defence policy” (ibid.).  Based on Howorth 
we see that security, as opposed to defence, received much earlier attention from the EU.  
However in recent times further steps in EU defence and security policy were necessitated by 
external factors like the prospect of the US military disengagement from Europe and the re-
emergence of insecurity and instability on the EU’s periphery (ibid.347). Factors like these 
are spurring a move towards defence integration in the EU. But still the EU continues to face 
obstacles in terms of achieving Rene Pleven’s dream of a defence Union as he suggested in 
1950.  
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Furthermore Zimmerman and Dur (2016) said that despite progress in the area of security and 
defence policy, there are huge questions to be answered. They point out the following 
concerns: they say that there are questions about the EU’s will and capacity to become a fully-
fledged military actor. There are concerns related to the lack of credible capabilities given the 
shrinking defence spending in Europe, technological limitations, divergent strategic outlooks 
and cultures among member states, as well as the fear of decoupling from and duplication of 
NATO. Kagan (2003) said that Europe is essentially mired in a culture which prevents the 
development of real military capabilities and he further says that the EU made efforts at 
creating credible military capability structures through the CSDP- but this is facing challenges 
from many sceptics including member state governments which are hesitant to transfer 
decision-making power in defence matters to the EU (see Zimmerman and Dur, 2016:220). 
Concerning this CSDP, Menon (2016) postulated that the CSDP has failed in its ambitions 
and Ojanen (2016) argues that there are pros and cons of the CSDP. This research contributes 
to the arguments raised by these authors. Menon and Ojanen’s articles focused on the CSDP 
and this is typical of many studies which have studied EU defence by focusing on CSDP yet 
the CSDP cannot be deployed inside the EU. We see also that there are diverging views on 
outcomes of EU CSDP policies. This research joins this debate and tries to contribute by 
shading more light on challenges faced in EU defence integration.  
 
Other attempts to study the defence field have been done through analysing EU foreign 
policy. For instance some have argued that the intergovernmental character of foreign policy 
co-operation is frequently made responsible for the failure of EU to produce collective 
decisions (cf., for example Nuttal 1997:19 & 2000:35; Pottering 1990:342; Rummel 1997:372 
in Wagner, 2003:577). A Howorth (2011) article looks at decision making in security and 
defence in the CSDP framework.  Although this article is useful, it is only limited to the 
aspect of decision making dilemmas in security and defence issues in the EU (Howorth, 
2011). This thesis contributes to a more understanding of challenges in EU defence 
integration by building on these arguments from existing literature.  
 
Previous and current literatures also help to justify why it is necessary to study the subject of 
defence integration in the European Union.  
 
Justification of the study based on Literature review  
The reason why the topic of defence integration in the EU is vital is because of the fact that 
defence matters.  Different writers on European studies agree with this view and so do I. For 
example Wæver (1996:123-125) argued that Europe can perhaps exist only if it has a defence 
identity, and is a recognised actor in the international area (in Ojanen, 2006:71). On a similar 
note Anderson et al (2016:31) argued that ‘no single European country is able to manage the 
violent conflicts, hybrid warfare challenges and sophisticated cyberattacks now taking place 
in and around Europe on its own”. They further note that defence cooperation is needed if 
Europe is to be a global security actor in its own right (Ibid.37). In unison, Posen argued that 
the EU should prepare itself to manage autonomously security problems on Europe’s 
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periphery to have a voice in settlement of more distant security issues, should they prove of 
interest and the EU realise that military power is necessary to have such an option (Posen 
2006:150-151; also Posen 2004 & Rynning, 2011:26). It is therefore important to understand 
why defence integration is difficult for the EU. Moreover it can also be pointed out that the 
lack of attention on EU defence integration studies justifies the necessity to do researches like 
this thesis as a way of shedding more light on the significance of this area. 
 
There are few studies on defence integration and this thesis contributes with more analysis 
Supporting the arguments on lack of studies on defence, Howorth wrote that “scholarship on 
European integration has traditionally focused on just about every policy area except defence 
and security policy” (Howorth, 2011:5). Similarly, Ojanen says that there was an absence of 
security and defence policy from the process of European integration (Ojanen, 2006:59) and 
that not even the Maastricht treaty of 1991 or the Amsterdam treaty of 1997 convinced 
anyone that there was a real intention to proceed in the field of defence integration- the CFSP 
existed merely on paper (Ibid. 60). On the defence aspect of CSDP, Andersson et al 
commented that while there is broad convergence inside the EU on the common security 
aspect of CSDP, there is much less convergence on the possible scope of common defence 
policy aspect of CSDP (Andersson et al 2016:5). It can therefore be seen than the defence 
aspect of EU integration is complicated.  Due to the significance of defence, this area is now 
starting to receive attention from both academics and the EU itself. This thesis is motivated by 
the need to contribute to this area which is getting renewed attention from the EU.  
 
Defence integration is becoming more important in its own right 
The European Global Strategy on Security (EUGS) was born in 2016 and this “EUGS has 
injected unforeseen dynamism into security and defence policy, as a field hitherto largely 
unaffected by moves towards European integration and communitisation” (Beckmann R and 
Kempin R, 2017: 1). A year after launching the EUGS and in September 2017 EU 
commission President, Juncker forwarded a timetable setting 2025 as the deadline for creating 
a ‘fully fledged European defence Union’ (Juncker, 2017 SOU Address).  Juncker has may be 
realised that ‘there is widespread concern over the current state of European defence and that 
the complexity of defence cooperation cannot trump the overarching benefits for collective 
action as Robert Axelrod put it (Andersson et al 2016:5). Based on these developments, it is 
clear that defence integration in now an important subject. After two decades of strategic 
timeout, ‘defence matters’ now as European leaders are once again pressed to focus on how to 
defend their territories, citizens and open societies (Ibid.9). As a result researchers need to 
understand the reasons why it is difficult for the EU to integrate in the area of defence.  
 
Using the inter-governmentalist theory; data from EU PESCO policy document and academic 
literature, the analysis section below answers the research question of why defence integration 
is difficult for the EU to achieve. Using the content analysis method, I gathered and analysed 
different arguments (from literature and the PESCO documents) that support and or oppose 
some of the reasons that explain why EU defence integration is difficult. As such the 
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following section outlines the reasons why EU defence integration is a difficult and 
challenging agenda for the EU to achieve. The following analysis section provides therefore 
the answers to the thesis research questions.  
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 Analysis: Reasons Why Defence Integration in the EU Is Difficult  
 
This section answers the research question by outlining and critically analysing the reasons 
why defence integration is a difficult assignment for the EU to achieve. In summary the 
reasons why EU defence integration is difficult are connected to inter-governmentalist theory 
explanations related to defending national interests; defending national sovereignty by 
member states; the influence of NATO on EU defence; challenges of decision-making in EU 
defence issues; disunity amongst EU member states; EU’s fear of failure; the normative-ness 
of the EU; costs and lack of trust in the area of defence amongst EU Member States.  
 
The PESCO decision was passed by the EU in December 2017 and was finalised in early 
2018. As promised in the research questions, I will analyse how PESCO can hinder defence 
integration and how PESCO can spur defence integration. In analysing the role of NATO, I 
also looked at the pros and cons of NATO in EU defence integration. By so doing one will be 
analysing the difficulties in the area of defence integration.   
 
To make the picture clearer, I have used the example of the positions of Germany, France and 
United Kingdom on defence issues to demonstrate the inter-governmentalist explanations 
related to national interests and sovereignty as well as to demonstrate how defence integration 
is possible if the influential EU Member States choose to cooperate. These are the issues that I 
will now discuss before the conclusions come at the end of the paper. I will start with 
discussing PESCO, then the NATO/USA impact, then the issue of sovereignty, followed by 
issues of decision-making, disunity, fear of deployment failure and lack of trust before giving 
the examples of Germany, France, United Kingdom and defence clusters. The final chapter is 
a conclusion summarising the thesis.   
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Chapter 4 
 
PESCO: The opportunities and challenges for defence integration   
 
Different writers have described the PESCO as a possible game changer for European defence 
cooperation (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:5) whilst others have said that PESCO can be 
seen ‘as a trailblazer for the defence Union’ (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2) due to the 
various ambitions outlined in the PESCO document. On 11 December 2017 the Council 
adopted a decision establishing PESCO with 27 EU Member States participating (Council 
press release 765/2017).  Since PESCO is a decision it is important to know what a decision 
means. According to Hartley “A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which 
specifies those to whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them” and a decision is 
different from a directive in that it can be addressed to an individual as well as a Member 
State. In the Grad Case (case 9/70) [1970], the Court of Justice of the EU decided that 
decisions can be directly effective (Hartley TC, 2014: 205).  The significance of this is that if 
PESCO is a decision (of which it is) then it should be binding on those who are participating. 
This is probably why others have described PESCO as  “a ‘sleeping beauty’ of EU defence” 
awakened by events the “Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014, countless terror attacks in 
Europe, migration crisis, shift in USA foreign policy and the United Kingdom Brexit among 
others (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:7). Due to the sensitivities of defence issues it has been 
emphasised that PESCO is not about placing defence capabilities under the control of EU and 
is not about excluding non-PESCO members (Ibid.50). The contradictions of PESCO are that 
it is a ‘decision’ but not under the control of EU and PESCO is inclusive but also exclusive. It 
is therefore necessary to analyse ways in which PESCO can be a motivator and possibly an 
obstructer of EU defence integration.  
  
What is PESCO?    
The PESCO document and its annexes are long. Here will be a brief explanation of the main 
contents of PESCO. Quoting from Fiott et al, PESCO include two components: binding 
commitments and specific projects. ‘Commitment’ means that those joining PESCO commit 
to increase defence budgets, having deployable units, participate in joint equipment 
programmes within European Defence Agency (EDA) and participate in at least one specific 
project (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, and 2017:8). PESCO projects are aimed at reaching 
capability and operation dimensions assessed by Member States themselves and the HRVP, 
EDA and EEAS through reporting (Ibid.). The December 2017 Council Decision on PESCO  
lists 17 collaborative projects which are: European medical command; European secure 
software defined radio; network of logistics Hubs in Europe and support Operations; military 
mobility; EU training mission competence centre; European training certification centre for 
European armies; energy operational functions; deployable military disaster relief capability 
package; maritime autonomous systems for Mine countermeasures; harbour and maritime 
surveillance and protection; upgrade of maritime surveillance; cyber threats and incident 
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response information sharing platform; cyber rapid response teams and mutual assistance in 
cyber security; strategic command and control system for CSDP missions and operations; 
armoured infantry vehicle / amphibious assault vehicle / light armoured vehicle; indirect fire 
support and EUFOR crisis response operation core ( Council Decision est. PESCO, 
8.12.2017). Mentioning all the 17 PESCO projects can help in availing a picture of what 
PESCO is really about. As can be noted from these projects, PESCO sounds like defence as 
opposed to just security issues. PESCO was introduced under article 42(6) of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. It allows for Member States ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and 
which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the 
most demanding missions’ to cooperate more closely than the EU27 context permits (Kempin 
and Kunz, 2017:7; PESCO council decision 2017; and Beckmann and Kempin, 2017:1). 
PESCO may be initiated in the CFSP with a qualified majority and in this process PESCO can 
be linked to the EU framework through the HRVP and EDA (von Ondarza, 2013:9). Thus 
even if Member States voluntarily make commitments to another through joining PESCO, it 
is important to note that PESCO is linked to the EU framework as von Ondarza reminds us.  
‘Under the Treaty of Lisbon the purpose of permanent structured cooperation is not solely to 
strengthen the operative capabilities of member states: it should be seen as the first step on the 
road to a European Defence Union’ (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2). If this is to go by, 
it can be argued that PESCO can significantly change the future of EU defence if its 
intentions are successfully executed. At the same time, a reader of PESCO can see some 
aspects in PESCO which are positive and some aspects which sound possibly constraining in 
terms of aiming for defence integration.  As such I will now turn to a discussion about the 
ways in which PESCO can spur and or hinder defence integration in the EU. In other words, 
the following paragraphs discuss the pros and cons of PESCO and by so doing; I will be 
answering the two sub-research questions, viz:   
1.   In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a turning point in EU defence 
integration?  
2. In what ways, if any, can PESCO be considered a drawback in EU defence 
integration?  
These two questions help in digging out the reasons why defence integration is challenging 
for the EU, which is the main research question.  PESCO allows for Member States ‘whose 
military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to 
one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions’. This statement exposes 
the differentiation aspect in PESCO and this differentiation can have both enabling and side-
lining effects in terms of achieving EU defence integration.  
  
PESCO can spur defence integration through Differentiated integration 
Differentiated integration is “the state in which the uniformity and simultaneity of integration 
of all Member States is more or less restricted by temporary or permanent exceptions’’ (von 
Ondarza, 2013:7) and in the EU “increasing differentiation presents an enormous challenge to 
the further development of the EU’’ (Ibid.5). But at the same time: “differentiation has proven 
to be an effective means of overcoming political impasses – but with the exception of the 
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European Social Charter, no differentiated integration project to date has succeeded in 
bringing all of the EU Member States together again” (Ibid.:7). Based on von Ondarza it can 
mean that PESCO is differentiating between those Member States ‘whose military capabilities 
fulfil higher criteria” and those who do not fulfil the higher criteria. It is difficult to know if 
those members who fulfil the higher criteria will one day be reunited with those who are 
excluded. PESCO is a special form of differentiated integration which is concentrated on 
developing military capabilities, while decisions about CSDP operations remain subject to all 
EU countries (Ibid. 9). Von Ondarza says that no differentiated integration project to date has 
succeeded in bringing all of the EU Member States together again: So can PESCO run the risk 
of splitting EU Member States in the area of defence forever? This is possible but considering 
that more than 25 EU Member States have joined PESCO (except Denmark due to opt-out 
under article 5 of protocol nr.22 TEU and TFEU and United Kingdom which is leaving the 
EU), there is a better chance that, if followed correctly, the PESCO agreement can help to 
spur integration in the defence field in the EU.  
 
I agree with the view that differentiated integration is one of the ways which can most likely 
produce positive movements towards defence integration. For instance Menon wrote that 
‘PESCO is intended to enable the Union to tackle capability deficits head on by allowing 
smaller groups of states to go further and faster absent political will on the part of all 
governments’ (Menon, 2011:80). Lack of political will is precisely one of the reasons why 
defence integration has been relatively stagnant in comparison to other areas. Differentiated 
integration in the defence area under PESCO offers a better chance to address obstacles of the 
past. As an example we can see that Schengen started with few like-minded states before 
being embraced by more Member States and was incorporated into the treaty itself- the same 
logic can be applied to defence through PESCO by starting with Member States who share the 
same vision and objectives (Andersson et al 2016: 6). This sounds reasonable. Even many 
decades ago Robert Schuman explained that “Europe will not be made all at once, or 
according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a 
de facto solidarity” (EU Commission, 2017:4 in Ladic, 2018: 5). Using historical lessons, it is 
now clearer that differentiation will be the primary method of European integration going 
forward especially considering the difficulties in enacting further EU treaty reforms (von 
Ondarza, 2013:7). These views are also shared by Fiott et al when they pointed out that 
PESCO amounted to the most flexible template to date for deeper cooperation among some 
Member States in a(ny) specific policy area- not just defence due to PESCO’s less 
prescriptiveness in terms of participating Member States and triggering procedures (Fiott, 
Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:18) . I agree with these views. The differentiation aspect of PESCO 
can indeed promise to make a difference. In addition to differentiation issues another defining 
aspect of PESCO is its accountability framework and its aim for irreversibility and its 
permanence framework (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:8 & 43) and it being implemented 
along the ‘hub-and-spoke’ rather than ‘pioneer group’ model (Ibid. 21). These are the positive 
prospects of PESCO. However “the criterion for entering PESCO shows contrasting exclusive 
and inclusive tendencies of PESCO.  There is an agenda oriented on ambitious exclusive 
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projects and an inclusive model to prevent the emergence of a multi-speed Europe in security 
and defence policy (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 2). Thus despite the positives 
associated with the differentiating dimensions of PESCO, one should also bear in mind that 
there are some aspects of PESCO that can hinder defence integration and these are part of the 
reasons why defence integration is difficult for the EU to achieve.  
 
How PESCO can also derail defence integration 
Differentiation and opt-outs dynamics in EU defence integration policies present difficulties 
in the quests to achieve defence integration in the Union.  For instance with the Lisbon 
Treaty, the number of opt outs reserved by individual Member States has continued to rise – 
because the opt-outs are set down in protocols to the EU treaties, they can only be established 
or rescinded through treaty change (though a state can retreat from its opt-outs unilaterally as 
per primary law) (von Ondarza, 2013:10). This von Ondarza assertion is valid since opt-outs 
have the effect of dis-integrating instead of integrating all members. In the area of defence, 
Denmark is an example of permanent differentiation, which is a situation whereby the goal of 
unified integration is abandoned in some or all areas while only smaller groups of Member 
States move forward is a specific area - thus we see that the Danish non-participation in the 
CSDP is almost an example of permanent differentiation (Ibid.). Even if smaller groups 
succeed in moving forward, like in the euro monetary zone, the effect is still lack of full 
integration of all Member States. In the defence field it can be argued that PESCO is more 
closer to the Europe a la carte concept- which implies an EU that is defined by 
intergovernmental agreements in which states are key players and maintain control over their 
individual treaties ad are able to determine which substantive issues they will participate in 
based on their capabilities and political interests (Ibid. 8 & 9). In this scenario the success of 
PESCO is hinged on the willingness of Member States to implement defence integration.  
Willing states can move forward with PESCO but “any process of differentiated integration 
carries the risk of marginalising the ones that are not part of the avant garde’ and ‘non PESCO 
members will be confronted with this risk’  (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:35). So, despite 
the positives, differentiated integration is one of the reasons why defence integration is 
difficult in the EU. We have to remember that PESCO will not be legally binding and that 
defining things that are ‘necessary’ will be a question of interpretation and the general 
prudence of Member States vis-a-vis  the use of force will not be easily overcome  (Ibid. 38). 
Historically these are the same scenarios that have prevented the achievement of defence 
integration in the EU. It is hoped that in PESCO a ‘combination of commitments made and 
peer pressure will incentivise decision-makers to contribute to operations and simultaneously 
raise the cost of defection’ (Ibid.) but relying on peer pressure is not sufficient enough to 
achieve defence integration though it helps in conjunction with other measures. Moreover, in 
PESCO ‘no enforcement mechanism has been established: state’s sovereign decisions remain 
the norm’ (Ibid.39). Thus the inter-governmentalists are right when they say that the nation 
states remain the central decision makers in EU defence matters, not the EU institutions. To 
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add to the challenges presented by opt-outs and negative differentiation, the fitting of NATO 
into PESCO is not that very clear.  
 
Challenges in linking PESCO and NATO 
PESCO is about improving EU defence capabilities but we also know that NATO has always 
historically been the pillar of EU defence. It is also a fact that currently 22 states are members 
of both NATO and the EU (Helwig, 2018:1). EU and NATO have always been working on 
ways to work together though there have been uncertainties. For instance  “while their joint 
declaration of July 2016 commits to deepening cooperation, the document contains no 
indication of how PESCO, CARD, and EDF should distribute defence functions between the 
EU and NATO without duplicating structures (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 3). Thus 
we see that some EU countries like the United Kingdom have been pro-NATO and not 
supportive of EU defence initiatives outside NATO in fear of duplication of roles, among 
other things. Yet some countries like Germany are of the view that “the EU could align 
PESCO more closely with the objectives of NATO” in line with the Germany idea of an 
inclusive EU defence policy’ (Helwig, 2018:1). In addition we see that “NATO allies that are 
participants of PESCO will also want to ensure coherence between what they develop under 
PESCO and what they have agreed to under the 2016 EU-NATO Joint Declaration and the 
related 42 action points (of which defence capabilities and industry and research are crucial)’’ 
(Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:50). So there are diverging views inside the EU Member 
States themselves on how PESCO and NATO should work together. The United Kingdom 
will remain an important factor in EU defence even if it leaves the EU since she will be a 
strong voice in NATO in alliance with the USA. To calm these concerns on the PESCO-
NATO uncertainties, “the EU emphasizes that PESCO does not compete with NATO’ and 
that the aim of PESCO is to develop national military capabilities that can be deployed under 
either the EU, NATO or UN flags (Helwig, 2018:3). What we learn here is that the EU has to 
deal with these complexities in order to make defence integration in the EU progress forward.  
For example agencies like the European Defence Agency are going to be used to link PESCO 
to the EU framework as part of the multifaceted efforts to connect PESCO to the EU. 
  
European Defence Agency (EDA) and  PESCO  
According to PESCO council decision (2017) the HRVP, the EU military staff (EUMS) and 
the EDA shall jointly provide the necessary secretariat functions of PESCO and be a single 
point of contact.  We see therefore that PESCO is linked to the EDA. EDA was created in 
2004 to improve European defence capabilities via the promotion of research and technology, 
armaments cooperation and creation of a European arms market and is made up of 28 defence 
ministers and is thus prey to the whims of the national ministers who control it (and who for 
several months failed to appoint a chief executive) (Menon, 2011:81 & 85). It can be seen 
here that, in line with the inter-governmentalist theory governments control the defence 
playground. Howorth also notes that EDA is ring-fenced by intergovernmental constraints 
though its direction is clearly towards ever greater cooperation and even integration 
(Howorth, 2011:24). Hopefully EDA will achieve the defence integration ambitions of 
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PESCO though it should not be forgotten that “EDA’s executive arm does not have the 
sanctioning powers to enforce joint capability development – as an intergovernmental body, 
the Agency is dependent on the willingness of governments to voluntarily embark on joint 
capability projects” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:46) .  Under PESCO there is what they 
call National Implementation Plans (NIP) which are needed from governments before they 
join PESCO and these serve as individual national binding commitments to PESCO and they 
are a mechanism through which the HRVP can hold EU governments to their word (Ibid.).  
Since EDA has developed experience since 2004 it is possible that this agency can help to 
further defence integration via PESCO. Nevertheless as the inter-governmentalist theory 
explains, the EU Member States are the key in making this progress happen. Thus the 
challenge in achieving defence integration also rests on the shoulders of the state’s failure to 
have the willingness to cause quicker progress in defence work. There is the CARD review 
mechanism within EDA which can however be used to consolidate defence cooperation 
between EU governments.    
 
The PESCO Dimensions of Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) 
CARD is meant to institutionalise a systemic exchange between Member States under the 
auspices of EDA and CARD will be used to identifying and closing gaps in Member State’s 
military and civilian resources (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 8).  On a similar note Fiott et al 
noted that  CARD, though technically separate from PESCO, is also complimentary to 
PESCO and “is designed  to encourage EU governments to align their defence budgets and 
capability plans and to concomitantly jointly identify common capability needs over the 
medium to longer-term” (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:45). In this sense one can see the 
helping efforts provided to PESCO by CARD.  PESCO is a step forward in the sense that it 
designed to move beyond the existing mode of voluntary commitment by saying firstly that 
before a government can be in PESCO they need to fulfil higher and more credible 
commitments to one another and secondly by regular review of common binding 
commitments made at the onset of PESCO (Ibid.). CARD is an opportunity to know gaps that 
need to be addressed. Nevertheless defence integration has failed in the past since, for 
example, the 1999 Capability Development Mechanism (CDM) and the 2001 European 
Capability Action Plan failed ‘because Member States balked at revealing gaps in their 
national defence capacities’ (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 9). There is no guarantee that this 
balking will not be repeated under PESCO. Another defence integration setback issue is that 
CARD will not ‘be a sanctioning tool nor will it take control of national defence investment 
plans’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:46). It means that there is no guarantee that states will 
implement their National Implementation Plan since there are no sanctions and things rely on 
peer pressure. To add further incentives, the EU has linked PESCO to the EDF as an attempt 
to increase chances of succeeding in defence integration this time around. The EU maybe 
knows the past challenges in the defence area and EU efforts around PESCO maybe designed 
to plug loopholes that have problematized defence integration in the past.      
 
The PESCO dimensions of the European Defence Fund (EDF) 
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As Beckmann and Kempin remind us, the EU Member States and the European Commission 
established the EDF to incentivise cooperation on key defence capabilities acquisitions. The 
EDF will co-finance initiatives where at least three EU states join forces to develop and 
procure defence products (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 8 ; and Beckmann R and Kempin R, 
2017: 2). It is clear from this that the EU wants to promote defence integration by promising 
to co-finance defence capability acquisitions when at least three Member States do it together.  
This is a good incentive if the addressees are willing to do it. The EU itself wrote that the 
European Commission currently contribute 20 % to joint EU capability projects under EDF 
and it said it is willing to increase this by an additional 10% if projects are placed within 
PESCO, with the hope of aiming for harmonisation for common defence programmes. The 
EU further noted that as of now 80% of procurement and 90% of research and technology 
happens at national level (EUCOM 2017; Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:47).  Thus EDF co-
financing is expected ‘to permit states and companies to operate more cost-effectively and 
such initiatives benefit especially strongly from the fund where their cooperation falls within 
the PESCO framework’ (Beckmann and Kempin, 2017: 2). These are helpful defence 
integration incentives since ‘the industrial dimension has long been another neglected child of 
European defence cooperation’ (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 24; Beckmann and Kempin, 2017: 
2). In summary it can be seen that PESCO is being used to try to revitalise defence 
integration. The reasons why defence integration has been difficult are those that PESCO is 
trying to address through these various incentives under CARD, EDA, EDF and so forth. The 
awakening of PESCO defence efforts were also aided by the 216 EUGS.   
 
EUGS dimensions of PESCO  
The 2016 EU global strategy for foreign and security policy is a legally non-binding 
document that replaces the 2003 European Security Strategy (Bendiek, 2016: 14) and the 
EUGS’s key elements include ‘fostering peace and guaranteeing the security of the EU and its 
citizens, since internal security depends on peace outside of the EU’s external borders’ 
(EUGS 2016; Bendiek, 2016: 14). The EUGS promise of protecting EU citizens is one of the 
central planks of the EU’s legitimacy (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 2017: 1). The 2016 
EUGS can be explained by the perceived necessity to create resilience in security and defence 
(Bendiek, 2016: 14). The ‘EUGS names resilience as the overarching goal of CFSP- in other 
words reinforcing the EU’s ability to defend against internal and external threats’ (Beckmann 
R and Kempin R, 2017: 3). Resilience is the ‘capacity to resist and regenerate’, as well as 
being ‘crisis-proof’ (Bendiek, 2016: 6). Fiott et al agreed with these view when they noted 
that the 2016 EUGS had a ‘strong emphasis on the need to make defence cooperation among 
EU countries the norm, even though EUGS talks of ‘enhanced’ instead of ‘permanent’ 
cooperation in defence (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017: 20). It can be further said that the 
2016 EUGS gave way to a process that resulted in a raft of EU defence initiatives like CARD, 
Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and EDF (Ibid.7) which are all linked to 
PESCO.  It can therefore be argued that defence is now a subject that has come to the 
forefront but achieving EU defence integration is constrained by different factors that include 
costs and lack of capabilities.    
Ocean Marambanyika 
22 
 
  
Costs as a major problem in EU defence politics 
The EDF offers co-financing incentives for projects done under PESCO in recognition of the 
reality that ‘cost’ is one of the major reasons why defence integration has been difficult for 
the EU to achieve.  Spending on security and defence is the key prerequisite for operational 
autonomy, i.e. the capacity to independently plan for and conduct civilian and or military 
operations (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 21 & 10). But the difficulty is that EU Member States 
are divided by the thorny issue of costs which renders some members even less anxious to see 
deployments occur (Menon, 2011:83) and thus hindering military integration in the EU. In 
addition, EU Member States are not likely to yield sovereignty over defence spending 
(Howorth, 2001: 766 &782; Ojanen, 2006:64). At the same time article 41(3) of the TEU 
prohibits charging operations with military or defence implications to the EU budget (Menon, 
2011:83). It can thus be quickly seen that cost avoidance is a problem area in the quest for 
military integration in the EU. We see for example that the United Kingdom and France 
accounted for over 40 % of EU defence spending (Ibid.84). Scholars like Kempin and Kunz 
have therefore postulated that Europe is far from being the world’s second largest military 
power due to collective and individual inefficiency in defence spending which lead to lack of 
interoperability – e.g. 84 % of all equipment procurement took place at national level in 2013; 
defence research and development has fallen from 20 %  benchmark in 2006 to 17,9% in 
2014 and defence research and development expenditure has fallen to 1% of total defence 
expenditure in 2014 (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 16)- and as such, Europe suffers therefore 
from ‘non-deployable assets, lack of training and problems related to hardware maintenance 
(Ibid.). All these are challenges that help us to understand why EU defence integration is 
difficult and challenging. From an inter-governmentalist perspective can be supported here 
since we can see that costs related to defence are a domain of national governments, yet they 
avoid taking pro-defence integration steps in due to costs of assets and deployments. Lack of 
capabilities can lead to capability crises.    
 
Lack of coherence and capabilities as a difficulty in EU defence integration 
 Problems in EU defence capabilities show that progress in EU defence cooperation and 
integration has not been going smoothly. The key security policy ambitions of the Lisbon 
treaty were coherence and capabilities (Menon, 2011:76). Yet European defence has lost over 
20% of military capabilities between 2008 and 2014 with further losses likely due to inaction 
in the defence area (Andersson et al 2016:10 & 11).  To illustrate this Anderson et al noted 
that between 1990 and 2015 there has seen a dramatic fall in in combat battalions: Western 
Germany had 215 battalions in 1990 but the unified Germany had 34 battalions in 2015. In 
the same period, Italy’s battalions decreased from 135 to 44; France from 106 to 43; United 
Kingdom from 94 to 50 and the US EUCOM from 99 to 14 battalions (Ibid.43). Based on this 
data, it is clear that the EU has faced reduced capabilities. For example the two most 
important constraints bedevilling the European security defence policy (ESDP) are the 
incoherence of many EU security policies, the turf battles that have characterised their design 
and implementation, and a chronic lack of the hardware required for effective military 
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intervention (Menon, 2011:76). In addition it can also be highlighted that the EU had half a 
million more personnel under arms than the USA but around 70% of them cannot operate 
outside their national territory (Ibid.79). This is a big challenge in EU defence integration 
since Member States are not willing to allow their 70 % personnel to be deployed outside 
their national domains.  In line Menon’s arguments, Hill (1993:306) argued that “the 
(European) Community is not an effective international actor, in terms of both its capacity to 
produce collective decisions and its impact on events’’ (Hill 1993 in Wagner, 2003:577).  It’s 
not easy to produce effective collective decisions, since under the Lisbon treaty, Member 
States dominate EU military and CSDP policies and the success or failure of these policies 
depends crucially on national governments displaying the political will to turn rhetoric into 
reality (Menon, 2011:76).  In recent times, faced with these defence challenges, the EU’s 
2016 EUGS, the EDF and PESCO have focused on the importance of developing military 
capabilities  and under article 42.6 of the TEU, PESCO calls for EU members to cooperate 
‘with a view to the most demanding missions’ which clearly defines the operational 
objectives for PESCO (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:28). Since PESCO was born in 
December 2017, only time will tell if the EU will manage to overcome the capabilities 
challenges through financial and support incentives outlined in the 2017 PESCO decision.  
These challenges, from an inter-governmentalist viewpoint, are mostly caused by the lack of 
will by EU Member States to take decisive steps that promote defence integration through 
joint actions to enhance capabilities.  
  
Using the inter-governmentalist theoretical inclination it is clear that “the idea of testing 
PESCO won the day only after a series of meetings by EU defence and foreign ministers in 
autumn 2016” and  Germany was particularly proactive in contributing with PESCO 
especially when it released its white paper on defence (Ibid.20). The defence tasks of PESCO 
reminds us that defence is a high politics area as it can be seen that ‘PESCO is a Member 
State driven process, meaning that decisions and activities are the responsibilities of PESCO 
members’ even though there will be support from EU bodies like EDA, EEAS, and HRVP 
with aspects like regular annual assessments and incentives (Ibid.32). PESCO is a new 
endeavour and it is not easy to judge in this short space since December 2017. Most PESCO 
projects may not take off until at least 2025 depending on the type and scale of these projects’ 
(Ibid.50). But the language used in PESCO help us to see and learn what the EU is attempting 
to do in order to overcome the various challenges that are inhibiting quicker progress towards 
EU defence integration. The EU learnt a lot under the CSDP era and improvements and 
incentives in PESCO are aimed at addressing challenges experienced under CSDP.  
 
CSDP-PESCO link  
A lot has been written on CSDP but in the context of PESCO it is important to note that 
“CSDP is exclusively oriented towards external threats, not intended for territorial defence 
and legally precluded from being deployed inside the EU” (Bendiek, 2016: 19). In other 
words “in accordance with article 42.1 TEU, CSDP operations are to take place ‘outside the 
Union’’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:35). Thus, from a legal viewpoint CSDP legally 
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belongs to CFSP and under article 42 paragraph 1 of the TEU, the CSDP is an integral part of 
the CFSP (Bendiek, 2016: 5 &7). Some EU Member States are not eager to engage in actions 
‘not intended for  (EU) territorial defence’ and this derails defence integration since states will 
be reluctant to be involved in long wars outside the EU. Still CSDP is dependent on EU 
Member States. As an illustration, CSDP has been mainly operational with 35 operations and 
missions to date and EU Member States contribute military capabilities since unlike NATO, 
EU has no military capabilities (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:27). CSDP itself has faced 
many challenges.   
 
“The biggest weakness of CSDP as a defence actor has been its failure to deliver on its 
promise of autonomy” as the EU has repeatedly turned to the USA and to NATO in serious 
destabilization threats on the EU’s borders  and “collective defence remains, in all official 
discourse, the responsibility of NATO” (Howorth, 2017:351& 352). Critics of PESCO argue 
that the future with PESCO will be more of the same as CSDP (Valasek, 2017:1). To make 
matters even more complicated, “the EU has been attempting to fund 28 separate armies, 24 
air forces, and 21 navies” and France, United Kingdom, Germany and Italy contribute 70 % 
of the total EU defence expenditure whilst the 15 lowest-spending EU Member States have a 
combined total budget of $822 million which is less than that of Africa’s Ivory Coast 
(Howorth, 2017: 355). Even further, one sees that of the EU’s 1,9 million troops ‘in uniform’ 
only 50 000 could be used for high intensity conflict (Ibid.). This can be summed up by 
saying that the “CSDP remains a project that is seriously suboptimal” (Ibid.). Howorth finely 
came up with a good assessment of CSDP which help to expose the defence challenges that 
the EU is facing. The hope is that PESCO can improve CSDP since PESCO is an instrument 
in support of CSDP policy (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:33).    
 
Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy highlighted the following scenarios under which a PESCO force or 
army can participate in an operation: 1. PESCO forces participate in CSDP mission together 
with non-PESCO members, 2. Participation in CSDP by PESCO members only, 3. CSDP 
missions with PESCO members only under article 44 of Lisbon Treaty, 4. A non-EU coalition 
with PESCO members only, 5. NATO led operation with PESCO members only or with other 
NATO members, 6. UN-led mission with PESCO members only and or together with other 
European states, and 7. an internal security (home defence) operation (2017:34). Here it can 
be seen that PESCO is dynamic and ambitious if these scenarios are to go by. It also shows 
that PESCO is about more than CSDP as it is also about industrial projects as well as 
protecting EU citizens- yet it is also less than CSDP which includes a substantial civilian 
component- and PESCO and CSDP are overlapping yet distinct (Ibid.53). In a nutshell the 
same challenges that faced CSDP can also befall PESCO and make the goal of defence 
integration a continuously difficult thing to achieve.     
 
In this section we have seen that PESCO can promote defence integration through 
differentiated integration, i.e. willing Member States can move forward and the undecided 
crew can join later. PESCO can also spur defence integration if the support to be provided by 
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the HRVP, the EDA, EDF and CARD come into reality. This support is to deal with problems 
of costs and lack of capabilities in the EU defence apparatus. The upside-down of PESCO is 
that Member States excluded from participating and those given opt-outs can contribute to a 
long term failure to integrate the entire EU into a defence Union. Another potential downside 
is that the same lack of will problem faced under CSDP can also lead to the demise of 
PESCO. The knitting of PESCO and NATO is still work in progress and this clarity is needed 
in order to see if NATO will not be an obstacle to PESCO even though the EU insists that 
PESCO and NATO will work well together. From an inter-governmentalist theory perspective 
we saw that PESCO is a high politics area were most crucial decisions are state-based and 
thus leading to the sluggish pace of EU defence integration since NATO is available as a 
back-up. Let’s now turn to a discussion on how NATO makes EU defence integration a tricky 
issue.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Impact of NATO and USA on EU Defence Integration 
 
Does the existence of NATO make EU defence integration less important and less pressing for 
EU Member States? On the one hand it is clear that NATO makes some EU member states 
less enthusiastic about pursuing a compact EU defence integration agenda. On the other side, 
there are EU members like Germany who think that NATO is not an obstacle to EU defence 
integration. The EU Commission itself has been at pains to say that NATO can complement 
defence integration efforts through for example the PESCO pact.   
 
NATO makes defence integration less pertinent   
Based on EU’s legal instruments, it can be argued that NATO makes EU defence integration 
less important. We can see for example that article 42 of Lisbon treaty states that any 
obligation to mutual assistance ‘shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and 
defence policy of certain member states’ and that any obligations must also be ‘consistent 
with commitments under the NATO, which, for those states which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation’ (Menon, 
2011:82; TEU). Based on this, it can be argued that it seem EU defence is reliant on NATO. 
In other words European defence will be firmly integrated with NATO and the transatlantic 
alliance with the USA is the undisputed core of European defence collaboration (Andersson et 
al 2016:12) and where the EU is heading in the field of security and defence hinges 
intriguingly on its relations with NATO (Ojanen, 2006:73). Even as recent as January 2017, 
the HRVP Mogherini called for the EU ‘to be built into a true defence Union that was not 
limited to the EU-27 because the EU’s security could only be improved, she argued, through 
external measures and close cooperation with NATO’ (Bendiek, 2016: 15). It is thus not a 
wonder to see that EU members of NATO still refer to NATO for their ‘common defence’ 
(Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:16). These developments make EU defence integration 
difficult because it is easier for Member States to rely on NATO which is already established 
than to contemplate establishing an EU military Union with all the nationalism and costs 
associated with it.  
 
Moreover recent events show that NATO is critical for EU defence. It is possible for EU to 
integrate its defence and still have NATO as a critical partner. But recent events point to a 
bigger role for NATO in EU defence than to efforts aimed at increasing EU defence 
integration. For example the NATO-EU Berlin Plus agreement of 2003 has been seen ‘as a 
way of tying EU and its action closely to NATO’ (Ojanen, 2006:69). Howorth (2001:783) 
talked of ‘the Natoization of the Union, or the US hegemony via the back door’ (in Ojanen, 
2006:70). So the EU-NATO relationship is complex in terms of seeing how the EU Member 
States can achieve EU military integration because some of them want NATO to play the role 
of defence protector. In a 2006 article Ojanen concluded by noting that EU-NATO relations 
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have two options: to separate or to fuse. Separation means the EU can make independent 
policies whilst the fusing model will mean ‘NATO has supremacy over the EU in central 
questions of security and defence’ (Ojanen, 2006:72). At the moment it seems NATO has 
supremacy in defence issues. The recent birth of PESCO is probably an attempt by the EU to 
achieve ‘separation’ or strategic autonomy. 
 
However, “the discussions about PESCO have revealed diverging strategic objectives among 
EU Member States” (Helwig, 2018:3). For example “France and Italy want the EU to be able 
to react independently to future crises in the southern neighbourhood. In contrast Poland and 
the Baltic countries are acutely aware of the possible threat from the east and support 
NATO’s objective of establishing a credible deterrent on the EU’s Eastern border. The 
successful implementation of PESCO is endangered by these different preferences’ (Ibid.). 
The divergences in the EU are being partly caused by views on NATO and this makes EU 
defence integration difficult to achieve. NATO’s collective defence is key for Baltic and 
Central European countries who are not so eager about Western Europe’s view which is 
increasingly looking at the EU’s goal of achieving ‘strategic autonomy’ in crisis management’ 
(Ibid.:1).  This is a challenge to the idea of EU defence integration since the EU Member 
States do not yet share a common understanding of the role of the EU and NATO in European 
defence (Ibid.). There are views which perceive the EU as a threat to NATO, where a 
harmonious state of affairs would now seem to require a division of labour and role 
specialisation between the two organisations (Ojanen, 2006:58). These problems can be 
explained through the inter-governmentalist theory because states are not willing to support 
defence integration. They prefer NATO because “the logic of EU integration means an 
eventual supra-nationalisation of defence, while NATO logic keeps it traditionally 
intergovernmental”’ (Ibid.69) and thus cementing continued state control of defence matters. 
It seems therefore that some Member States see an EU-NATO dichotomy when it comes to 
defence because ‘on important issues – from the fight against terrorism to the strategic 
orientation of EU defence policy- the positions within the EU and NATO continue to differ 
(Helwig, 2018:4). This weakens and makes EU defence integration difficult. But Member 
States know that they alone cannot defend their territories individually. Some favour the idea 
of EU defence and others favour NATO to act in defence issues because states need 
international organisations to provide cover for the legitimacy of military interventions - if 
NATO is not interested or not appropriate, the EU is an obvious alternative (Menon, 
2011:88). In addition to these challenges, there is “a serious inability among the EU’s 
Member States to agree on sending soldiers into combat missions (Henrion 2010 in Howorth, 
2017: 356) and NATO under USA leadership hesitate less than the EU in deployment matters.  
Despite the challenging side of the NATO-EU defence dimension, the other side of the coin 
shows that NATO can complement EU defence efforts if there is a positive will to do it that 
way.  
 
NATO can however also complement EU defence integration 
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One of the positive aspects of the EU-NATO Berlin agreement is that under the agreement, 
the EU is authorised to draw on NATO assets and capabilities for its own military operations 
(Berlin+, 2003 in Bendiek, 2016: 18). If the EU achieves defence/military integration it can 
therefore continue to work well with NATO by using NATO assets and maybe save money. 
Thus instead of seeing an EU-NATO dichotomy, one can also support the view that an EU 
“security and defence Union will rest on three pillars: the Security Union, the Defence Union 
and EU-NATO cooperation” (Ibid.6). The Berlin plus agreement points out that ‘the EU’s 
territory can only be effectively defended if the EU and NATO cooperate closely’ and this is a 
message repeated in the 2016 EUGS (EU-NATO statement, 2016 and Bendiek, 2016:18).  
The risk is that such pronouncements can embolden EU Member States who prefer NATO at 
the expense of promoting an EU defence Union and thus further derail the quest for EU 
military integration. It is not possible to talk of NATO without mentioning the USA since it is 
the backbone of NATO. What can be noted is that from the late 1990s NATO, under the USA 
started to develop a profile more focused towards operations like anti-terror actions outside 
Europe (Ojanen, 2006:62) and this tendency has continued up to now. The USA’s gradual 
shift of focus from the EU on defence operations can help the EU to seriously think about in 
the direction of a defence Union.   
 
USA dis-engagement can lead to EU unity on defence issues though USA remains the 
key 
I agree with Gordon’s (1997/1998) argument that it is only if the USA disengages from 
Europe and the EU experiences a kind of ‘shock’ that EU unity will occur (also Rynning, 
2011:25). For example we can see now that the election of Donald Trump has accelerated the 
Franco-Germany security and defence cooperation because President Trump has been 
inconsistent and at times sceptical of NATO leading to strategic uncertainty about the future 
and credibility of USA engagement in Europe – and because of this, EU members need to be 
more autonomous in security and defence (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 7). This does not mean 
that the USA will become less important for the EU. In fact the EU is motivated by regional 
security needs and the desire to influence American policy (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005 ; 
Lieber and Alexander:2005; Rynning, 2011:27) and as Calleo (2009) argued,  ‘a Europe 
locked in opposition to America is unlikely to succeed in uniting itself” (Calleo 2009) because 
‘the role of the USA is destined to remain important, both as a reference point for Europe’s 
ambition and also because Europeans are more likely than not to remain partially dependent 
on capabilities and leadership from across the Atlantic’ (Andersson et al 2016:37). And it is a 
fact that securing good relations with the USA is a top foreign policy objective for many 
European governments (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 24). In short, a sceptical USA view of 
NATO can galvanise EU Member States to further their defence integration efforts as seen 
with PESCO which was adopted in December 2017 when Trump was the President of USA 
who raised critical questions about NATO’s role in defending Europe. Nevertheless USA will 
continue to be vital in EU defence as it was during World War I and II.   
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In summary we have seen that the NATO argument fits better with the inter-governmentalist 
explanation which places nation states and national interests at the heart of decisions on 
defence politics. Building on leading scholars in this area, it has been argued that NATO 
contributes in causing EU defence integration to be difficult because EU Member States are 
divided on the role of NATO in defending the EU. For example Eastern Europe and the 
United Kingdom favour a bigger NATO role whilst Western Europe is eager for strategic 
autonomy. These are divergences that can slow the pace of EU defence integration. However 
if the USA begin to show less interest in defending Europe, then this can help to push things 
in favour of EU military integration even though we should not underestimate the significance 
of the USA as a pillar of EU defence. Part of the reasons why some Member States favour 
NATO is that NATO is an inter-governmental organisation which means that national 
sovereignty is better protected in a NATO set-up than transferring defence issues to a supra-
national EU Defence Union.  
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Chapter 6: 
 
Sovereignty makes defence integration more difficult to achieve 
 
How does sovereignty impact defence integration in the EU? An inter-governmentalist 
oriented argument is that EU Member States do not want to hand over decisions on defence 
matters because this is one of the highest areas of sovereignty. As Stanley Hoffman argued 50 
years ago, integration would not and could not be happen in the area of ‘high politics’ of 
which defence was the ultimate example (Hoffmann 1966 in Howorth, 2017: 344). EU 
defence integration is therefore difficult to achieve because defence is seen as a sovereign 
area which cannot be put under a supra-national EU organ. First I will briefly define what 
sovereignty is and then building on scholarly literature it is argued that on the one side 
sovereignty makes defence integration difficult and on the other side there are positives of 
sovereignty.  
 
Definition of sovereignty: 
Ondrej wrote that ‘Westphalian sovereignty is defined as an imminent characteristic of a state, 
and no other unit, higher or lower, can become a sovereign but a state. When a state ceases to 
exist, its sovereignty also ends. And, contrarily, it emerges when a new state comes into a 
being. The existence of a plurality of sovereign structures on one territory is in this approach 
unthinkable’ (Ondrej: 2016:55 & see Ladic, 2018: 4). If this definition is to go by, then it 
means that there is no state without sovereignty and the only thing that guarantees state 
sovereignty is the means to defend it, i.e. control of the army. However, in other non-defence 
areas, sovereignty can be pooled in line with what Moravcsik (1998:67) stated by saying that 
“sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures 
other that unanimity… Sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors are permitted to 
take certain autonomous decisions, without intervening vote or unilateral veto”(in Wagner, 
2003:581). The Multi-level governance theory (MLG) argues that European governance was 
now dominated by a complex web of interconnected institutions at the supranational, national 
and sub-national levels of government (Hooghe and Marks 2014:263) and that “state 
sovereignty has been diminished by restrictions on the ability of individual governments to 
veto EU decisions and by the erosion of collective government control through the council of 
ministers” (Ibid.). The multi-level governance theory is more correct in socio-economic areas 
and less so in defence matters. The defence integration area is still dominated by inter-
governmentalist based actors.  
  
State sovereignty as a reason for slow defence integration 
 PESCO notification to the Council and the HRVP (2017) clearly states that “participation in 
PESCO is voluntary and leaves national sovereignty untouched”.  This sentence is arguably a 
confirmation of the continued obstacles caused by sovereignty in EU’s efforts designed to 
achieve defence integration.  
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In addition to the PESCO notification, article 3a of the TEU states that the Union ‘shall 
respect (member state’s) essential state functions, including enshrining the territorial integrity 
of the state, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security’ and that ‘national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State (Menon, 2011:82; TEU). I 
agree with Beckmann and Kempin when they argued that sovereignty has always been a red 
flag in the entire field of security and defence – exploiting the full potential of European 
integration will require the taboo on sovereignty to be lifted and a realistic dialogue to be 
open up (2017: 3). For example, because of the sensitivity of sovereignty, most EU 
governments, largely for internal political reasons, vigorously denied that the European Rapid 
Reaction Force (ERRF) amounted to a ‘European army’, stressing that it is not a standing 
force, that each national government retains sovereign control over the deployment of its own 
troops, and that there is no European uniform (Howorth, 2001:768).  From this we learn that 
states do not accept the idea of ceding their armies to EU control. On the same path, Gordon 
(1997:100) argued that at the heart of the problem lies the Member State’s reluctance to 
permit delegation of sovereignty to centralised institutions (also Wagner, 2003:577). As such 
sovereignty has been constantly present and sometimes jeopardizing further integration 
(Ladic, 2018: 3). Wagner also argued that “the incentives to delegate sovereignty to 
supranational institutions hardly apply to the realm of the CFSP” (Wagner, 2003:578-579). 
And for example in a French understanding, the defence industry is partly state owned and is 
a key aspect of the nation’s strategic autonomy whilst in Germany defence industry is private 
and family-run (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 25). The France case shows that some EU member 
states “remain determined to exercise their sovereignty rights over foreign and security 
policy” (Howorth, 2017: 343). Way back in the 1990s, Van Staden (1994:153) argued that 
‘for the foreseeable future none of the EC members can be expected to commit itself to 
majority decision-making or to accept the authority of a supranational body in questions of 
life and death’ and Ojanen notes that the argument in the 1960s was that the process of 
integration would not come to include security and defence since these areas formed the core 
of national sovereignty (Ojanen, 2006:60). This is still the same today even though there are 
signs of progressive movements under PESCO. But PESCO is to be reviewed through the 
EEAS/HRVP under CARD. At the same time Menon reminds us that national governments 
have tried to shape the EEAS to suit their own preferences (Menon, 2011:79 Survival) and 
Fiott et al highlight that ‘capabilities developed in PESCO will remain national and not put 
under any kind of permanent and common (EU) command’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 
2017:34). The end result of these arguments is that defence integration in the EU is made 
difficult by state’s wish to keep sovereign control in the area of defence.  There is however a 
constructive side of sovereignty though it’s limited.  
  
Sovereignty has positive sides 
Despite the obstructive aspects of sovereignty, some inter-governmentalists see the terms of 
international co-operation as ‘reflecting the relative bargaining power of different 
governments, who, while never abnegating their sovereignty, may be willing to ‘pool’ or 
‘delegate’ it as efficiency and effectiveness require’ (Puchala, 1999:319). Sovereignty can 
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thus be delegated but only in bargains that help to achieve national interests as opposed to 
achieving defence integration.  Sometimes states that form the inner core of the EU power 
structure have to forfeit the most official sovereignty (to make things work) (Bendiek, 2016: 
10). Wæver (1996:116) argued that the content of sovereignty changes over time but Ojanen 
says this can imply that divergences in understanding sovereignty may widen (in Ojanen, 
2006:72) and consequently divide decisions on military integration. A positive use of 
sovereignty by the EU has been that EU countries have embraced poling of sovereignty as a 
resource which can be used to act within international regimes (Keohane, 2002 -in Ojanen, 
2006:72). But in short, the EU is struggling in the area of defence integration and collective 
military operations.  
 
In summary, the argument here is that sovereignty is still a high politics area dominated by 
governments who are not consistently and collectively supportive of EU defence integration 
because for them, controlling defence is a life and death subject.   Sovereignty can be pooled 
to bargain in order to achieve national and common interests but the sluggish pace of EU 
defence integration shows that, for the most part, sovereignty is part of the obstacles hindering 
faster defence integration. In addition to sovereignty, defence integration is impacted by 
aspects like disagreements in decision-making, fear of mission failures and lack of trust 
between member states in defence intelligence issues. 
 
 
Ocean Marambanyika 
33 
 
Chapter 7 
 
Decision making procedures, infighting, fear of military 
failure and disunity slows defence integration  
 
Some of the reasons causing difficulties in the work to integrate EU defences are challenges 
related to decision making procedures, institutional infighting, the EU’s fear of mission 
failures and lack of unity amongst EU Member States. For example a recent literature by 
Webber (2014) and Bendiek (2016) states that “academic debate is dominated by the theory 
that the CFSP structures are dysfunctional. Some warn of disintegration, since key decisions 
continue to require unanimity and since essential differences persist among Member States on 
an appropriate role for the USA in Europe, on Russia policy, and on migration policy” 
(Webber, D 2014:341-365 & Bendiek, 2016: 6).  In this sense one can argue that the 
consensus principle in CFSP and CSDP is integration inhibiting (Beckmann R and Kempin R, 
2017: 3) because, for example, as recent as 2011 Menon wrote that all 27 EU Member States 
must approve CSDP operations which do not fall under the purview of permanent structured 
cooperation (Menon, 2011:83). It means that the unanimity/consensus policy is a contributor 
to making it difficult to integrate the defence sectors in the EU. It means that Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV) is an alternative which can help to promote defence integration 
together with other actions. For instance Schulz & Kooning (2000) and Golub (1999) argued 
that QMV significantly increases the speed of decision making and Wagner (2003:578) 
argued that QMV “is extremely helpful to make the CFSP more effective”.  In a nutshell 
QMV can address that challenges caused by unanimity requirements in the defence 
integration area. Even if defence decisions are dominated by inter-governmentalist settings, 
some EU institutions provide administrative support to national governments. However there 
is a problem of institutional infighting which contributes to slowing work on defence 
integration.  
 
 As an example of problems caused by institutional infighting, it has been said that in 
February 2010 USA’s president Obama cancelled a USA-EU meeting allegedly because of 
institutional infighting within the EU (Rynning, 2011:24). In support of the institutional 
problem issue Menon wrote that the EU’s deployment of distinct policy instruments lead to 
use of different decision making procedures which can in turn lead to friction and incoherence 
and that rivalries between the European Council and the Commission have become somewhat 
a cliché (Menon, 2011:77). On a similar note Rynning (2011:24 & 29) noted that the EU’s 
complex institutional system pitches agents of Council, Commission and Member States 
against one another and the CSDP is structurally weakened by the nature of EU bargaining. 
Because of these institutional challenges, member states blame European level institutional 
structures for their own failings (Menon, 2011:77). I support the institutional problem as part 
of the causes leading to difficulties in EU defence integration. Even under PESCO it is the 
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EEAS/HRVP who should provide support with the CARD review of National Implementation 
Plans made as PESCO commitments by Member States. It is important that EEAS institutions 
must function well if moves towards more defence integration under PESCO are to go well.  
 
EU Fear of mission failure - normative and soft EU  
Another problem associated with the reasons why EU defence integration is difficult is the 
EU’s fear of embarking on missions that fail. Moreover the EU is said to prefer soft power 
than hard power. This means that strengthening military power through more defence 
integration can compromise the normative soft power thinking inside the EU. According to 
Manners, normative power describes an actor’s ability ‘to define what passes for ‘normal’ in 
world politics and this is the greatest power of all since it sets standards for the actions of all 
actors (Manners 2002:253 in Bendiek, 2016: 8). The EU’s military problem is that the EU 
‘has no tradition of power politics or energetic political action (Andreani et al., 2001:39; 
Howorth, 2001:773). The EU thus fears to use military power since they don’t have a power 
tradition. As Howorth noted, the most important challenge with CESDP is the EU’s fear of 
the price of failure- failure would also place a heavy question mark over the other political 
dimensions of EU integration (Howorth, 2001:773). On a similar note Ehrhart (2002: 19-24) 
sees the EU as a ‘co-operative security provider’ that bases its actions on normativisim, 
prevention, inclusiveness, multilevel orientation, integration of non-state actors, 
multilateralism and co-operation with other organisations  (in Ojanen, 2006:66). And Smith 
(2003) noted that the EU’s five foreign policy objectives are promotions of regional 
cooperation, human rights, democracy, good governance, prevention of conflicts and fighting 
international crime (in Ojanen, 2006:66). Similarly, Moravcsik (2003) noted that the EU is 
more competent in non-military questions whilst Menon (2003) noted that the EU can take 
care of crisis prevention and reconstruction after crises, whilst NATO can take care of 
military crisis management proper (in Ojanen, 2006:68 JMCS vol44). On the same path 
Andrean et al (2001:74-76) say that the EU’s aim is to address the root causes of conflicts 
rather than using power against their symptoms, generosity in development assistance and 
willingness to share the benefits of multilateralism (in Ojanen, 2006:66). It can thus be argued 
that the EU’s self-perceptions as a soft and normative power contribute to her hesitance in 
increasing military strength through defence integration. Manners (2002) and Kalypso and 
Withmann (2013) posited the EU is a ‘normative power’ that is exceptionally attractive to 
other states (Manners 2002: 235-258; Kalypso & Withmann, 2013) and Bendiek (2016:8) 
noted that EU policies are tied to the EU’s self-conception as a soft power. Despite the good 
aspects of soft power and normativisim, these aspects are also a factor in hindering defence 
integration in the EU in addition to the disunity in Union.   
 
As an example of disunity in the EU related to the Libyan war, le Monde newspaper 
(31.3.2011, translated by Menon, 2011:76) stated that the EU has failed miserably and is 
incapable of agreeing on how to act, on whether to recognise the Libyan opposition and most 
of all, on the legitimacy of the use of force. In addition, Germany was reluctant to do military 
intervention in Libya in contrast to United Kingdom and France and this is a public 
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illustration of a division that has haunted the ESDP since its inception (Ibid.:83). Besides the 
Libyan crisis, one can also say that there has been a traditional and unproductive opposition 
between southern and Eastern Europe on threat perceptions and different defence priorities 
and these differences will remain (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 7). These differences are not new 
but they are still alive today. Way back in 1966 Hoffmann wrote that European political 
projects are tied down by sovereign nations with ‘domestic differences and diverging world-
views’ which result in ‘diverging foreign policies’, and ‘any international system based on 
fragmentation’ tends to reproduce diversity (Hoffmann, 1966: 864; Rynning, 2011:29). These 
differences are present in deployment of forces and in how far defence integration should go. 
These differences are also based on lack of trust and all this contribute to making it difficult to 
achieve defence integration.  
 
An example of trust issues can be that closer Franco-Germany cooperation on defence is 
faced with a number of obstacles including fear of unwanted technology transfers and distrust 
between companies in different countries (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 25). In addition we see 
that member states of EU and NATO lack the willingness to share sensitive information 
(Helwig, 2018:2). For instance member states are reluctant to share findings from their 
intelligence services within the multilateral framework of the NATO alliance; instead they 
prefer bilateral agreements (Ibid.). This also helps to show that Member States pursue 
national interests at the expense of common EU defence interests and thereby slowing down 
defence integration.   
 
In summary it can be argued that using unanimity in voting makes is difficult to move faster 
with EU defence integration. On top of that institutional infighting in the EU and the EU’s 
fear of failing in missions contribute to making it harder to take decisions that increase EU 
military power through defence integration. In addition we see that diverging defence and 
foreign policies and lack of trust in sensitive defence areas all make defence integration in the 
EU difficult. This is in line with the inter-governmentalist theory which argues that defence 
integration will be difficult to realise because of the sensitivity of this area.  Actions by 
Germany, France and United Kingdom in the defence area can help in showing the brighter 
sides of defence cooperation and the drawback of non-cooperation.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Germany, France, United Kingdom and Defence Clusters 
outside the EU framework – as illustrations 
 
How do the roles played by Germany, France and the United Kingdom in the EU help us to 
understand the challenges in EU defence integration? Giving brief examples of EU power 
brokers, viz, Germany, France and the United Kingdom help to illustrate the challenges and 
opportunities in EU defence integration since these nations are leaders in this area. For 
example,  Puchala, (1999:319 jcmsvol37) noted that  for inter-governmentalists, “the 
initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and promulgators of deepening and broadening 
European integration are the national governments in general, the governments of the major 
EU countries in particular, and heads of governments and powerful ministers most 
specifically” . Things move in a better direction when France and Germany work together 
than when they don’t.  Defence integration was slowed by the consistent vetoes led by the 
United Kingdom. Lack of movement in defence integration has led to formation of defence 
clusters outside the EU frameworks. This is a testimony to the difficulties faced by the EU in 
defence integration.  
  
In terms of the impact made by differences between the more powerful EU countries, it can be 
highlighted that France’s and Germany’s ideas on the role of the military and the use of force 
differ, their defence priorities, threat perceptions and regional priorities differ (Kempin and 
Kunz, 2017: 12). Furthermore Kempin and Kunz observed that differences in force 
employment between France and Germany have prevented real operational deployments of 
the Franco-German Brigade (FGB), with the exception of its deployment in Mali (Ibid. 19). 
They further noted that France defines strategic autonomy as her own ability to decide and act 
freely in an interdependent world, thus preserving French independence and sovereignty, 
whilst on the other hand, Germany carefully avoids to use the term ‘strategic autonomy’ and 
‘prefers recurring to civilian approaches over the deployment of military forces’ (Ibid.12 & 
20). Using this data from Kempin and Kunz it can be argued that diverging views between 
France and Germany are not helpful in promoting defence integration. When these two major 
EU countries work together chances of deeper defence integration become enhanced.   
 
For example Kempin and Kunz postulate that they are ‘convinced that the Franco-Germany 
relationship has to be the nucleus of any European defence integration’ – ‘a truly Franco-
Germany approach in the area of security and defence policy can be the starting point of a 
European project’ (Ibid.9). They give an example of the positives of Germany-France 
collaboration by noting that Paris and Berlin’s revitalised relationship in the area of security 
and defence led to the EU’s action to implement the ‘Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy’ in which the EU’s strategic autonomy is the leitmotiv. 
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(Ibid.6). Bendiek agrees, and so do I, that France and Germany are the key by noting that at 
the center of the power structure are Germany and France whereas members like Greece and 
the Baltic states are more of norm takers in the EU (Bendiek, 2016: 10). As recent as 13 July 
2017 Germany and France used their bilateral Ministerial Council to propose a list of steps 
intended to satisfy the exclusive and inclusive project models of PESCO (Beckmann and 
Kempin, 2017: 2). Due to Germany and France support PESCO was adopted by the Council 
of the EU in December 2017. It can be argued that the input of France and Germany is vital if 
the EU is going to achieve a defence Union. This argument is pro inter-governmentalist 
theory since it sees powerful states like France and Germany as more influential than EU 
institutions in terms of moving the defence integration agenda forward.  
 
Taking a closer look at Germany defence policy, it can be seen that the Germany army white 
book of 2016 declares Germany’s favour of the long term objective to create a European 
security and defence Union (Bendiek, 2016: 15). This is good for the future of EU defence 
integration if other bigger nations like France support the same goal.  Glatz and Zapfe, (2017) 
commented extensively on the 2016 Germany white book.  They noted that the Germany 
Bundeswehr (army) white paper of 2016 see Germany and NATO perspectives as inseparable 
and the aim for the current Bundeswehr planning is that Germany, British and French armed 
forces are to form the backbone of European defence within NATO (Glatz and Zapfe, 
2017:1). I agree that Germany, France and the United Kingdom will always be keys in 
European defence. However what we see here is that NATO is a big factor in the future of EU 
defence integration. Helwig (2018:4) notes that Germany has both a military and political 
interest in closely linking the EU with NATO whilst Glatz and Zapfe (2017:3) think along the 
same line by stating that the Bundeswehr consistently subordinates itself under NATO 
guidance through near-complete integration into NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP) 
and participating in multinational force development. There is also a Germany-led Framework 
Nations Concept (FNC) which ‘is a systematic and structured approach to gradually build 
European forces within NATO, and to thereby indirectly facilitate the generation of forces for 
specific missions (Ibid.7) and this FNC focuses on the coordinated development of 
capabilities, developing large multinational formations and by September 2017, 19 nations 
had joined Germany-led FNC (Ibid.:4). We can note therefore that Germany is active in 
defence activities but within NATO. The future of defence integration must always take into 
consideration what role NATO will play. In contrast to a positive Germany long term 
objective to create a European security and defence Union (Bendiek, 2016: 15), the United 
Kingdom has been historically unenthusiastic about EU military integration.  
 
United Kingdom vetoes that hindered defence integration 
The United Kingdom has contributed significantly to the stagnant pace of EU defence 
integration. For instance Regelsberger and Wessels (1996:35) argued that the Maastricht 
Treaty introduced QMV to the CFSP but the British government blocked any attempt to use 
the possibility of majority voting (in (Wagner, 2003:588). Furthermore in 2003 France, 
Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Poland supported the creation of EU Operational 
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Headquarters (OHQ) but the United Kingdom refused (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 17).  Even in 
2011 the United Kingdom vetoed the case of an Operational Headquarters (Howorth, 2017: 
361). Way back in June 1997 at the European Council in Amsterdam, the United Kingdom 
under Prime Minister Blair vetoed proposals to merge Western European Union into the EU 
itself though Britain signed the St Malo Declaration with France some 18 months later 
(Howorth, 2011:5). Also in 2002 France and Germany announced that ESDP was to be 
developed into a security and defence Union but this idea only gained momentum in 2016 
after the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the EU(Bendiek, 2016:15). In short, EU defence 
integration has had its setbacks due to various oppositions by the United Kingdom.     
 
Defence clusters happening outside CSDP  
 Why are defence-clusters emerging outside of the EU framework, and what are their 
implications for EU defense integration? According to Fiott et al, some European countries 
have defence cooperation clusters with one another outside the EU framework due to their 
desire to maintain national sovereignty in defence- meaning that states need to maintain 
security of supply for defence systems and components and need to protect jobs in the 
defence sector within national borders – for example in 2015 European defence turnover was 
102 billion euros and 430 000 people were employed in the defence sector (Fiott, Missiroli & 
Tardy, 2017:47; EUCOM 7.6.2017). The cluster approach is cooperation among 
geographically close and like-minded Member States (Howorth, 2017: 357). For example the 
November 2010 Anglo-French summit in London resulted in agreement on bilateral defence 
collaboration, but did not place this in the wider context of the CSDP (Menon, 2011:88 
Survival). Recently the Nordic Defence Cooperation was extended to include Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia (Bailes 2006 in Howorth, 
2017: 357). There is also the Benelux cooperation; Visegrad cooperation (Poland, Hungary, 
Czech and Slovakia); Central European Defence Cooperation (Austria, Croatia, Czech, 
Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia); the Weimar Triangle (France, Germany and Poland) and 
the Portugal-Spain cooperation (Howorth, 2017: 357). Even more, Germany is ‘developing 
integrated structures with the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and Romania and announcing 
a security partnership with the United Kingdom (Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 19). There is the 
19 member Germany FNC (Framework Nations Concept) aiming to close capability gaps 
identified by NATO but to be fixed by FNC-members  coordinated by Germany (Glatz and 
Zapfe, 2017:4). Under the Germany-FNC all members retain fully sovereignty over their 
forces and their deployment and equipping and they can pull out their forces at any point 
(Ibid.5). What we learn from these clusters is that it seems as if EU states are attracted to 
groupings that make them to retain their sovereignty over defence forces outside the EU 
institutions. The impact of this is that defence integration inside the framework becomes 
difficult. The EU has decided to support PESCO projects by hoping that these defence 
clusters can do joint defence projects under PESCO and in the end help in bringing these 
different clusters within the EU framework.  Some defence clusters outside the EU have 
worked whilst others have not. For example Fiott et al noted that ‘mini-lateral defence 
groupings such as the Nordic Defence Cooperation, the Weimar Triangle and the Visegrad 
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Group have generated political dialogue without necessarily resulting in joint capability 
programmes’ (Fiott, Missiroli & Tardy, 2017:47) whilst collective defence cooperations that 
have been success stories include the TIGER school where French and Germany and Spanish 
helicopter crews are trained and the activities of the European Air Transport Command 
(Kempin and Kunz, 2017: 17). The hope is that Germany and France can help to take these 
clusters into the EU framework through PESCO. These two countries supported PESCO and 
they are playing a leading role though time will show how it will end up. 
 
In this chapter I used the examples of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and different 
European defence clusters to show the difficulties faced in EU military integration. We saw 
that differences between France and Germany slows progress in defence integration whilst 
collaboration between the two move things forward like what happened with PESCO in 
December 2017. Defence clusters are happening outside the EU due to various reasons 
including the need by EU Member States not to put the sovereignty of their armies under EU 
institutions. However defence clusters can be made part of PESCO and be indirectly brought 
into the EU framework in the long term. The unsupportive stance by the United Kingdom 
over the years has been an obstacle to EU defence integration. When the United Kingdom 
voted to leave the EU in 2016 it became easier for PESCO to be born, though other factors 
like recent Russian aggressive behaviour, terror attacks in Europe, the migration crisis, Brexit 
and the USA criticism of NATO also motivated the birth of PESCO and the new focus on 
how EU should deal with defence issues.   
 
 
Ocean Marambanyika 
40 
 
Chapter 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
Summary of the reasons causing EU defence integration to be difficult: based on the 
inter-governmentalist theory.  
In conclusion it can be said that the inter-governmentalist theory gives a plausible explanation 
of why EU defence integration is difficult because of its focus on the dominance of EU 
Member States on decisions related to defence politics. The main research question was “why 
is EU defence integration difficult?” The aim of the thesis was to find and analyse answers to 
this question based on data and theory. In short the main theory and data-based reasons why 
EU defence integration is difficult are related to the unwillingness of EU Member States to 
cede control of defence to EU supra-national institutions; constraints caused by Member 
State’s need to retain sovereignty over their armies; differences of opinions amongst Member 
States on the role of NATO in EU defence and divergences of views on military use between 
EU’s major powers like France, United Kingdom and Germany. The EU and her Member 
States faces problems related institutional infightings in the EU; lack of trust in sharing 
sensitive defence information; fear of mission failures if they deploy forces as well as 
differences in threat perceptions. All these factors contribute to making EU defence 
integration difficult for the EU to achieve.  
 
Analysing the PESCO decision passed in December 2017, one can learn a lot about the 
opportunities and challenges in defence integration in the EU. On the one hand PESCO can 
move defence integration to the next level by allowing willing member states to make 
commitments to each other and progress with joint military capability projects. Unwilling or 
undecided Member States can join later when they fulfil ‘a higher criterion’. This 
differentiated integration dimension of PESCO is good in that it avoids being bogged down 
by sceptical Member States who do no support defence integration. The drafters of PESCO 
seem to have realised that part of the reasons for the failures to integrate EU defences are 
related to costs and lack of capabilities. To address these issues the PESCO decision 
endeavours to link PESCO projects to the EU framework through offering support and 
financial incentives via EDF, EDA, CARD and the EEAS/HRVP office.  PESCO is clear that 
Member State’s sovereignty will remain untouched and again this is a realisation that 
sovereignty has been a major factor slowing down EU defence integration efforts.  The 
incentives offered to PESCO participants via EDF, EDA and CARD are aimed at promoting 
EU defence integration within the EU framework. PESCO is relatively new and only time 
will tell whether this endeavour will succeed. I agree that ‘‘the success of PESCO will depend 
on participating Member States adhering to the common binding commitments made to each 
other’’ and that “PESCO will be judged a success if it leads to the creation of a more 
effective, capable and joined-up Union in security and defence” (Fiott, (Missiroli & Tardy, 
2017:51-53). The EU’s intention is, after all,  to achieve a defence Union  as we can see that 
in the 2017 State of the Union Address, Juncker forwarded a timetable setting 2025 as the 
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deadline for creating a ‘fully fledged European defence Union’. This research therefore 
contributes to the debate by outlining reasons why it is difficult for the EU achieve this 
defence Union in the hope that current and future policies can be made knowing what need to 
be corrected.   
 
Another challenge PESCO aims to address is the role of NATO in EU defence integration.  
Under the agreement, participating PESCO members commit themselves to ensure 
interoperability with NATO. The United Kingdom, Germany and most eastern European 
states want NATO to play a bigger role in EU defence. Countries like France want strategic 
autonomy to enable independent military operations without too many constraints. The 
drafters of PESCO tried to balance all these challenges that are making EU defence 
integration difficult. There is also a concern that PESCO’s differentiation aspects will side-
line those who do not fulfil ‘a higher criterion’. Considering that more than 25 EU Member 
States have signed to PESCO, I think the exclusion argument is not a big concern at the 
moment.   
 
Defence clusters which are sprouting outside the EU framework are a sign that it will be 
difficult to achieve EU defence integration. These clusters are simply giving a signal that all 
EU member states are failing to have one defence cluster made up of all 28 Member States. 
The architects of PESCO (the HRVP office) probably realised these challenges and they are 
trying to address this by proposing PESCO projects with the hope that the different European 
defence clusters will join PESCO projects. This is an indirect and long term effort to bring the 
different clusters into the EU fold and hopefully achieve a defence Union in the future.  
 
Most, if not all, of these defence integration difficulties can be linked to the inter-
governmentalist theoretical propositions. This is because nowhere is the role of individual 
Member States more pronounced than in defence policy and its Member State behaviour that 
has produced the most severe problems in defence areas (Menon, 2011:81) as seen through 
disunity, lack of trust and failure to make integrative decisions. Whatever the institutional 
fixes created by the Lisbon Treaty, it is unreasonable to expect them to alter the preferences of 
national governments in a policy sector as sensitive as defence (Ibid.87) with all these taboos 
linked to sovereignty. We see for example that the United Kingdom vetoed discussions on 
defence matters within the institutions of the EEC/European Community/EU for 50 years 
until the 1998 St Malo summit (Howorth, 2001:769) partly because the United Kingdom 
favours a reliance on NATO than on EU defence integration. In classical realist terms the 
CSDP “is a case of power politics” (Rynning, 2011:25) since, for instance the United 
Kingdom can enjoy more influence within NATO together with USA which is a close ally.  
 
Moreover, the ESDP and CFSP were always characterised by relationships between 
governments with a highly limited role for community institutions (Menon, 2011:81) as we 
can still see with PESCO which gained momentum due to Germany and French support and 
due to Brexit.  Wagner also argues that “the delegation of competencies to the EU’s 
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supranational institutions is unlikely to make European crisis management more effective”, 
instead EU’s security policy will remain inter-governmentalist (Wagner, 2003:576) as can be 
seen in the dominant power of states in various European defence clusters and PESCO 
projects. 
 
It can be seen that even in the Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties, CFSP and CSDP were under 
pillar two where inter-governmentalism is considered to be sacrosanct and all decisions are 
officially taken either at foreign minister or at Heads of State or government level (Howorth, 
2011:5-6). In other words defence and security was an area in which states would not 
renounce their decision making rights and thus confirming the centrality of states (Ojanen, 
2006:59). Even way back in defence history, the period from mid-1960s to 1980s is called the 
eurocslerosis period due to the Member State’s refusal to further surrender their sovereignty 
and the inter-governmentalist theory is conventionally seen as the framework to explain this 
period of state self- interest (Awesti, A. 2006:2). Also long back in 1966, Hoffmann argued 
that integration takes place if there is a permanent excess of gains over losses and he said a 
defence community would weaken the state, as defence was a zero-sum nature (Ojanen, 
2006:59). Some argue that EU institutions have a big role in defence integration but ‘inter-
governmentalists attribute little influence to supranational agents or institutions’, ‘they see the 
movement toward, and the timing of, closer international co-operation as resulting from the 
converging national interests of states’ (Puchala, 1999:319). Currently PESCO seems to offer 
hope as a convergent zone for joint defence efforts in the EU. Factors like Brexit, Russia 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, waves of terrorist attacks in Europe, the 2015-2018 refugee 
movements to the EU and the current USA Trump directed scepticism towards NATO have 
all contributed to the birth of PESCO and the urgent need for the EU and EU governments to 
do something related to furthering defence integration in the EU.   
 
Most major reasons for the sluggish pace of defence integration rest on the shoulders of EU 
Member States. To address these problems the EU Member States must work together with 
the EU institutions if the hope of achieving an integrated defence Union is to be realised. EU 
institutions have massive experience in already integrated areas like the four freedoms and the 
monetary and economic areas. These experiences can be transferred to the area of defence 
even though it will demand more willingness and commitment from EU Member States. After 
all the failure or success of EU defence integration will be determined by the ability of EU 
Member States to move forward with integration of their various European armies.  
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